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Abstract. Deep Neural Networks were first developed decades ago, but
it was not until recently that they started being extensively used, due to
their computing power requirements. Since then, they are increasingly
being applied to many fields and have undergone far-reaching advance-
ments. More importantly, they have been utilized for critical matters,
such as making decisions in healthcare procedures or autonomous driv-
ing, where risk management is crucial. Any mistakes in the diagnostics
or decision-making in these fields could entail grave accidents, and even
death. This is preoccupying, because it has been repeatedly reported that
it is straightforward to attack this type of models. Thus, these attacks
must be studied to be able to assess their risk, and defenses need to be
developed to make models more robust. For this work, the most widely
known attack was selected (adversarial attack) and several defenses were
implemented against it (i.e. adversarial training, dimensionality reduc
tion and prediction similarity). The obtained outcomes make the model
more robust while keeping a similar accuracy. The idea was developed
using a breast cancer dataset and a VGG16 and dense neural network
model, but the solutions could be applied to datasets from other areas
and different convolutional and dense deep neural network models.
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1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks were first developed decades ago, but due to their com-
puting power requirements, it was not until recently that they started being
extensively studied and implemented in many fields that have a direct impact
in our lives. Since then, they are progressively being applied and have under-
gone far-reaching advancements, even getting a spot in healthcare treatments or
autonomous vehicles. These are very critical matters, and having a proper risk
management is pressing. Some errors in the diagnostics or decision-making in
these fields could potentially lead to major incidents that put people’s lives at
risk. This is worrisome, because it has been repeatedly reported in the literature
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that deep learning models are easily attacked. Thus, these attacks must be stud-
ied to be able to assess their risk and integrate it in risk analysis procedures,
and defenses need to be developed to make models more robust against them.
For this work, adversarial attacks were selected, as they are ubiquitous. Thus,
they are a significant parameter to take into account when analyzing and measur-
ing risk. To work towards managing such risk, several defenses were implemented
against it and compared, i.e. adversarial training, dimensionality reduction and
prediction similarity. The obtained outcomes made the model more robust while
preserving a similar accuracy. The idea was developed using a breast cancer
dataset and a VGG16 and dense neural network (DNN) model, but it could be
applied to other datasets and different convolutional neural network (CNN) and
DNN deep neural network models.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the
work found regarding adversarial attacks and their defenses. Section 3 details the
adversarial attack used, while Section 4 explains the proposed defenses against
it. The results are given in Section 5 and Section 6 lists the lessons that were
learned.
2 Related Work
The adversarial attack has been widely studied in deep learning. Taking advan-
tage of the sensitivity of the models, the attacker adds noise to a specific input
sample, modifying the image imperceptibly to change the original output predic-
tion of the sample. The first adversarial example against deep neural networks
was generated using a L-BFGS method [10]. This discovery made researchers
look into this new attack, discovering more efficient adversarial attacks, such as
Fast Gradient Sing Method (FGSM) [5], Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [4], Pro-
jected Gradient Descent Method (PGD), Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack
(JSMA) [8] and DeepFool [7].
Since then, new methods have been found to avoid new adversarial attacks.
Nowadays, there are two types of countermeasure strategies for adversarial ex-
amples: reactive (detecting adversarial examples once the deep neural network
has been built) and proactive (making deep neural networks more robust before
adversaries generate adversarial examples). This work compares three defenses:
adversarial training, dimensionality reduction and prediction similarity.
2.1 Adversarial Training (Reactive)
This defense retrains the targeted model with the training data, once the ad-
versarial examples have been added, so it learns to classify them correctly. This
idea was introduced in [10]. Adversarial training is a widely used defense against
adversarial attacks and it has improved over time. However, it has not achieved
competitive robustness against new adversarial examples once the model is re-
trained [11,2].
input data
prediction phase
noise obtain-
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Fig. 1. The procedure for obtaining an adversarial example
2.2 Dimensionality Reduction (Proactive)
This defense can be implemented in several ways with different effectiveness in
strengthening the original model, depending where new dimesionality reduction
layers are inserted. However, all variants have the same idea behind: passing
data through a dimensionality reduction layer (autoencoder and encoder layers,
in our case) to remove as much noise as possible from the input image. Thus,
the model is able to generalize, avoiding adversarial examples. Based on refer-
ence [1], dimensionality reduction may be useful to make the targeted model
more robust against adversarial examples. For the case of deep learning, CNNs
and autoencoders are used to carry out the dimensionality reduction. Particu-
larly, it is known that the autoencoders might make the model stronger against
adversarial examples [9,3].
2.3 Prediction Similarity (Proactive)
This defense adds an external layer to the model, which saves the history of
parameters obtained through the input images. Adversarial attacks need several
predictions of similar images to get an adversarial example. Therefore, this layer
can return an adversarial probability (the likelihood that an adversarial example
is being generated), after computing the similarity between the input image and
previous images. If this adversarial probability is high (different from case to
case) this layer could take action to avoid the adversarial attack. There are
several algorithms to compute the similarity value between two images. The
most widely used metrics are the mean squared error (MSE) and peak signal
to noise ratio (PSNR). However, in the last three decades, different complex
metrics have been developed trying to simulate the perception of human vision
by comparing two images [13], i.e. structure similarity metric (SSIM) [14] and
feature similarity metric (FSIM) [12].
3 Adversarial Attack Generation
As mentioned in Section 2, the attack type chosen for this work is the adversarial
attack. Particularly, we have implemented three types, namely FGSM, BIM and
PGD (Fig. 2), through the foolbox library1.
Fig. 2. Original images and their adversarials. Scale was changed for clarification.
For the experiment, a dataset of breast cancer images was used [6], but could
be generalized to other classification tasks. Then, we developed a model formed
by a CNN (VGG16 pre-trained model) and a DNN (Fig. 3), as it is widely used.
input data
VGG16
DNN
Prediction
Fig. 3. Our model’s structure. The VGG16 could be replaced by any CNN.
4 Defenses to Adversarial Attacks
Once the related work on attacks and defenses has been outlined, this section
will detail the particular implementation of proposed defenses.
1 https://github.com/bethgelab/foolbox
4.1 Adversarial Training
As noted in Section 2, adversarial examples are obtained and then added to
the original training data. Then, the new training data is used to retrain the
model (it becomes the defended model, by adversarial training). Although the
new model is more robust against the added adversarial examples, it is easy to
obtain new ones and stay in an inexhaustible circle of attacking and defending.
retraintrained model
+
training data
adversarial examples
defended model
Fig. 4. Standard adversarial training.
4.2 Dimensionality Reduction
Three variants of dimensionality reduction are covered in this subsection, which
are based on the same idea, but the returned defended model is different.
The middle autoencoder variant is obtained by training an autoencoder
using CNN features, that is, once the outputs of data are obtained through CNN
(VGG16 in our case), an autoencoder is trained using these outputs. After the
autoencoder is trained, it is inserted before the DNN (Fig. 5). In this case, the
CNN and DNN are maintained with the original structure (original weights), so
they are not retrained. In short, the middle autoencoder “cleans” the noise of
CNN’s outputs before using them as DNN’s input data.
input data
VGG16
DNN
Prediction
middle autoencoder
Fig. 5. Middle autoencoder model.
The encoder variant is obtained by taking the encoder part of the middle
autoencoder. Then, a new model is built by inserting it between the initial CNN
and a new DNN. The new DNN is trained with the encoder’s output as input data
and outputting the initial classes. This defense differs from the others, because
the encoder trains a new DNN (Fig. 6) so the structure of the model changes. As
a summary, the encoder reduces the dimensionality of DNN’s features, erasing
the least important ones to avoid noise.
input data
VGG16
New DNN
Prediction
encoder
Fig. 6. Encoder model.
The initial autoencoder variant trains the autoencoder using the selected
dataset and inserts it before the CNN. Both the CNN and DNN keep the original
weights, since they are not retrained (Fig. 7). Again, the initial autoencoder
“cleans” the image noise before making predictions with the initial model.
input data
VGG16
DNN
Prediction
initial autoencoder
Fig. 7. Initial autoencoder model.
In the case of having a trained model, the autoencoder variants could be
better for their use as defense, because no parts of the original model need to
be retrained. However, the encoder variant shows that a model that originally
contains an encoder layer could add robustness, by using it as an adversarial
detector in parallel. Therefore, we would obtain two different predictions (the
original one and the one created by the defended model). In case of different pre-
dictions, the model used as defense could detect a possible adversarial example
(Fig. 8).
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Fig. 8. External detector of adverse examples using the encoder.
4.3 Prediction Similarity
As mentioned in Section 2, this defense adds an external layer to the original
model, which saves the history of input images used for prediction and other
parameters of this action. In our case, these parameters are user, image, pre-
diction value (the class and the probability of this class), minimum distance (to
all previous images), prediction alarm (number of times the percentage of the
class is smaller) and distance alarm (number of images with distance less than
threshold). There are different possible actions that the output layer could take,
such as blocking or predicting with a secundary model. In our case, if our layer
detects something suspicious, it returns the opposite (or another) class. Thus,
if the adversarial attack is detected, this action automatically avoids it, since
it will return another class. This makes the adversary believe that he/she has
already achieved the adversarial example, when in fact it is not. Thus, these pa-
rameters could aid decision-making outcomes and be useful for risk management
measurements.
input data
model predict
prediction take action
alarm
Parameter 1
Parameter 2
Parameter 3
Parameter 4
history
Fig. 9. Generalization of the prediction similarity defense.
5 Results
This section will detail the results obtained with each defense through two types
of adversarial examples: the initial model’s adversarial examples and the de-
fended model’s adversarial examples (new adversarials).
Initial adversarial examples: All three defenses have been tried on this
case. Each defense was tested to calculate how many initial adversarial examples
are no longer misclassified. Adversarial training is the best option of the three
to avoid initial adversarial examples (Tab. 1), as the model is retrained with the
initial adversarial examples directly. Dimensionality reduction defends against
this type of attack, while the prediction similarity does not, since the process
of generating initial adversarials has already been carried out. It merely detects
when an adversarial attack attempt is happening, which is useful as a parameter
for risk assessment.
Table 1. Percentage of known adversarial examples that are no longer adversarials and
how our defended models behave with new adversarial examples. Computed 3 times
and averaged.
Defendes Initial adversarials
Adversarial training 92.0%
Middle autoencoder 60.4%
Encoder 64.3%
Initial autoencoder 70.5%
New adversarial examples: Once the defenses had been tested with initial
adversarial examples, new ones were generated to attack the defended model. In
this case, the adversarial training is not at all robust, as it is easy to get new
adversarial examples of the defended model. However, dimensionality reduction
is more robust in this case, as is visible in (Fig. 10), since the new adversarials
become distinguishable for the human-eye. Finally, the similarity of the predic-
tions is the one that detects the greatest number of generation processes of these
new adversarials (99.5% detection success). The difficulty of this defense is
selecting adequate parameters and thresholds, and these can change depending
on the dataset, the adversarial attack and the chosen metric. In our case, it has
been implemented with the parameters from Section 4 and the SSIM metric.
As far as we know, this is the first time that this type of dimensionality re-
duction and prediction similarity have been proposed as defenses for adversarial
examples (which are the hardest to avoid). In addition, concretely for the dy-
namic risk analysis case, the prediction similarity defense is useful because it is
an attack detection approach that could give meaningful insights for calculating
risk levels.
Fig. 10. Image results of the different dimensionality reduction defenses.
6 Lessons Learned
For this work, a widely known attack was selected (adversarial attack) and sev-
eral defenses were implemented against it (i.e. adversarial training (that was
used for comparison), dimensionality reduction and prediction similarity (the
proposed two new defends). The obtained outcomes make the model more robust
while maintaining a similar accuracy. The idea was developed using a breast can-
cer dataset and a VGG16 model, but the solutions could be applied to datasets
from other areas and different CNN and DNN models. The highlights from dif-
ferent defenses studied in this paper are the following:
– Adversarial training: it is not helpful because new adversarials can be
generated, so it becomes an endless circle.
– Dimensionality reduction: it works when looking for new adversarials,
because the generated noise becomes perceptible for the human eye. Also, it
keeps the accuracy stable while making the model more robust.
– Prediction similarity: it has the advantage of not having to modify the
model and it could be a useful input for risk assessment, as it detects when
an attack is being carried out with a high accuracy.
In the future, these defenses could be applied to other types of machine
learning, such as reinforcement learning, and they could be integrated in risk
assessment measurements.
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